We analyze the effect of a major tax reform on foreign firms. While foreign firms that are active in the respective country should be directly affected, other foreign firms could also be indirectly affected through competition. On the evening of December 15 th , 2017, the final version of the U.S. "Tax Cuts and Job Act" was published. With an event study design, we show that following the announcement, the European market overall exhibits positive abnormal returns. We find particularly positive market returns for the European firms that generate revenues in the United States. Our results also suggest that the European firms that face strong competition from U.S. firms exhibit significantly lower returns.
version would pass the Senate. In this paper, we examine whether and how the European stock market reacted to the announcement.
Three main findings emerge from our analysis. First, the TCJA had a significant impact on the European stock market. We find an overall positive reaction of European stocks to the TCJA. The mean daily return was 0.7% immediately after the final content of the bill was published. Second, we find particularly positive returns for the European firms that generate revenues in the United States. Third, foreign firms were also indirectly affected by the reform.
We find lower returns for European firms following the enactment of the TCJA if they face significant competition from U.S. firms. Thus, our results suggest that the stock market incorporated the concerns regarding competition. Accordingly, some firms benefit from the lower tax burden of their U.S. operations, and other firms lose due to tougher competition from U.S. firms in their domestic markets.
Stock market responses to tax reforms have been studied in the literature in various settings. 1 In a recent study, Wagner et al. (2018a) analyze the stock market response to the 2016 U.S. election. Both presidential candidates had very different plans regarding the tax system.
The authors link the stock market response following the surprising election of Donald Trump to these differences. In a later paper, Wagner et al. (2018b) analyze stock market reactions around important dates in the legislative process of the TCJA. Both papers find that stock prices in the United States reacted accordingly to the difference between the initial and revised expectations regarding the passing and content of the reform.
These studies, however, examine the effects of tax reforms on the respective domestic stock markets. Although the international effects of national tax reforms have rarely been examined in the literature, other policy events have been discussed considering international effects. Examples include monetary policy (Aizenman et al. 2016 , Eichengreen and Gupta 2014 , Feldkircher and Huber 2016 and elections (Cunha and Kern 2018) . The literature in these international settings often focuses on the American prominence in the financial system and thus analyzes how other countries are affected by the United States (Danzman et al. 2017 , Eichengreen and Gupta 2014 , Eickmeier and Ng 2015 , Winecoff 2015 . A study by Cunha and Kern (2018) analyzes the impact of the 2016 U.S. election on international financial markets.
By using ETF data, the authors find an overall negative effect of the election on financial markets. For our study, it is interesting to note that the European countries in their study mostly exhibited only moderate negative returns of borderline or no significance following the U.S. election.
The U.S. election triggered a large shift in expectations regarding the tax regime in the United States. Although the election was important for U.S. markets in terms of taxation, other differences between the candidates may have been considerably more important internationally.
For instance, both candidates differed widely in terms of trade policy. 2 Thus, by focusing on the election, it is difficult to isolate the effect of tax regime expectations on foreign markets. Furthermore, Cunha and Kern (2018) focus on the overall effect of the election on a given foreign stock market. By using ETF data, it is obviously not possible to determine whether there are heterogeneous effects for different firms. Our design builds on firm-level data, and we can thus examine firm-specific reactions and potentially uncover offsetting forces.
To the best of our knowledge, no paper has yet investigated the effects of the TCJA on foreign firms. Moreover, our main contribution is the investigation of the effects of a major tax reform on foreign firms. As far as we know, we are the first to document cross-border effects of a tax reform on a foreign stock market. Regarding Japan's adoption of a territorial tax system in 2009, a recent paper by Bradley et al. (2018) Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3342182 firms. However, they conclude that the cross-border spillovers from the reform were insignificant.
In a recent paper, Kim et al. (2018) examine the effect of corporate tax cuts outside the United States on the competitive situation of U.S. domestic manufacturers. They find that foreign corporate tax cuts affect the profitability of U.S. firms negatively, thus indicating increased competition. Although we focus on a stock market reaction, our study closely relates to Kim et al. (2018) . We also examine cross-border effects of a foreign tax reform. However, we investigate the opposite direction by focusing on the cross-border effects of a U.S. reform.
In accordance with Kim et al. (2018) , our findings suggest that investors believe the competitive situation to change due to a foreign tax reform. Therefore, we provide a first answer to their call for research that examines the cross-border effects of the TCJA.
Our study has policy implications. The TCJA started a discussion regarding whether other countries need to react for maintaining a competitive tax system. One fundamental aspect of this discussion is the question whether and how firms outside the United States are affected by the TCJA. Our results indicate that investors indeed expect that the TCJA affects firms in Europe and that domestic firms could especially suffer from tougher U.S. competition. This paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the TCJA with respect to its potential international effects and derives our hypothesis. Section 3 contains explorative statistics and describes our empirical strategy. Section 4 presents our empirical results and various robustness checks. Section 5 concludes.
Cross-border effects of the TCJA
The legislative process for the TCJA started as the bill was introduced by Congressman Kevin Brady to the House of Representatives on November 2 nd , 2017 and ended when President Donald J. Trump signed it into law on December 22 nd , 2017. On the afternoon of December Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3342182 15 th , 2017, Senators Marco Rubio and Bob Corker declared that they were going to back the final bill of the TCJA. Until then, it was far from certain that the reform would pass the Senate in 2017 and when it would take effect. As the Financial Times put it, "Party leaders [were] operating on razor-thin margins […] with no support from Democrats." Without convincing the two Republican Senators Rubio and Corker, the bill would possibly not have made it through the two chambers in 2017.
After the senators' statements, investors learned that the bill was most likely going to pass the following week and signed into law by the President before Christmas. Even more important was that investors learned the final content of the bill. The Senate and the House had passed different versions of the TCJA before. However, the two versions significantly differed in some important parts. For instance, the House bill suggested that the corporate tax rate cut becomes effective in 2018, whereas the Senate amendment delayed it to tax year 2019. The final version of the tax reform followed the House version and took effect in 2018.
Let us briefly discuss the main features of the bill regarding international operations.
The corporate tax cut from 35% to 21% constitutes the most striking feature of the TCJA. Due to the territorial tax system in most European countries, the European firms that operate in the United States directly benefit from the lower corporate tax rate on their U.S. profits. Additionally, the bill features immediate expensing of certain new capital investments. The immediate expensing might also benefit the European firms that operate in the United States.
The TCJA also imposed a "Base Erosion and Anti-Abuse Tax" (BEAT) that targets international transfers. The final income tax due is the maximum of either the regular tax liability or 5% on income ignoring all deductible payments to international affiliates (10% in 2019 through 2025 and 12.5% thereafter). An important detail is that transfers regarding the costs of goods sold (COGS) are excluded from the calculation of BEAT. European firms may be directly affected by the BEAT regime since it applies to both U.S. and foreign-parented Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3342182 groups. Therefore, we expect it to have a negative effect not only on international European firms active in the United States but also on U.S. firms with international supply chains.
However, the previously proposed versions by the House and Senate provided even stricter rules and probably would have harmed international firms even more. 3 Therefore, this final version of the BEAT regime could be seen as a lesser evil. Alltogether, we expect that the European firms that are active in the United States benefit from the final version of the TCJA. This leads to the following hypothesis:
H1: European firms that have significant U.S. operations benefit from the final version of the TCJA. Their stock prices should react positively to the final version of the TCJA.
The second channel through which foreign firms could be affected is competition from U.S. firms. Suppose that a European firm is competing with a U.S. firm in an international market. If the TCJA has increased the competitiveness of the U.S. firm in the international market, the European firm may have a more difficult time competing. This simple example suggests that firms may be indirectly affected by foreign tax reforms due to the change in their relative competitiveness.
Indeed, one of the major aims of the TCJA was to make U.S. firms internationally more competitive. First, U.S. firms benefit from the large corporate tax cuts and immediate expensing of new investments. Moreover, the TCJA changes the U.S. tax system from a worldwide system to a territorial tax system. The profits earned by foreign subsidiaries are in general no longer subject to U.S. taxation on repatriation. An exception to the territorial system constitutes the so-called "Global Intangible Low Tax Income" (GILTI) earned by controlled foreign corporations (CFCs). Fifty percent of the modified income of a CFC may be subject to U.S. taxation if it exceeds a certain return depending on the "qualified business assets". Effectively, this rule applies only if the corporate tax rate of the foreign country is lower than 13.125% (from 2026 onwards 16.4%). In a recent paper, Lyon and McBride (2018) argue that the GILTI regime may at least partly offset the benefits of the territorial system and thus could diminish the gain in international competitiveness of U.S. firms.
Additionally, the final bill introduced the so-called "Foreign Derived Intangible Income" (FDII). Intangible income received by a U.S. firm from goods and services used outside the United States is effectively taxed at a lower rate of 13.125%. This rule is officially meant to incentivize U.S. multinationals to relocate intellectual property to the United States.
However, since the reduced tax rate only applies to foreign sales and services, it could also be seen as an export subsidy. Therefore, it is not surprising that this rule is highly discussed concerning potential WTO violations. Whether or not FDII violates international standards, U.S. firms can benefit from this special tax rate if they generate income from foreign activities.
The lower tax rates, the change to a territorial system and FDII altogether strongly improve the competitiveness of U.S. firms in foreign markets. As a result, investors may expect European firms to face tougher competition from U.S. firms in the future. This discussion leads to Hypothesis 2:
H2: European firms that compete heavily with U.S. firms lose from the TCJA because U.S. firms gain competitiveness following the TCJA.
3 Empirical strategy
Event Study Design
In our examination, we follow the common event study methodology discussed in detail by MacKinlay (1997) . We first describe the relevant event and the corresponding event Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3342182 windows. Then, we need to define the expected return as the return that would have been expected in the absence of the event. We chose the publication of the final version of the TCJA on the afternoon of December 15 th , 2017 as our event and the statements of Senators Rubio and Corker, which also occurred around this time. Importantly, due to the time zone difference, the European market had already closed for the weekend as these statements occurred. In fact, as the European stock market closed on December 15 th , it was not clear that the TCJA would pass If stock markets respond efficiently, we can only expect a price reaction if new information becomes available. We acknowledge that since previous versions of the TCJA had already passed the House and Senate, markets most likely expected that some tax reform would pass in the United States. However, the two previous versions of the TCJA differed, especially in the parts relevant to international firms. Most importantly, it became clear during our event that the reform would take effect in 2018 and that the final version included the FDII, BEAT and GILTI regimes described above. Therefore, the final version revealed new information. To examine the potential effects on other important dates during the legislative process, we analyze additional events in Section 4.3, namely, the introduction (passing) of the House Bill on November 2 nd (November 17 th ) and the passing of the Senate version on December 4 th .
Following the event study literature, we use abnormal returns as our variable of interest in most of the following analysis. Abnormal returns are calculated according to (1).
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3342182
is the abnormal return, is the observed return and [ | ] is the expected return in the absence of the event, each for firm i in period t. For longer event windows, we compute cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) as the sum of the abnormal returns of firm i during the respective event window. Different ways of computing the expected returns have been developed in the literature. For the main part of our analysis, we follow the most common approach to compute the expected return by using a market model described in (2).
(2) = + ⋅ + is the market return. We estimate the parameters , for each firm with the data from the year previous to our event. Our estimation window is given by December 15 th , 2016 to December 15 th , 2017. We chose the STOXX Global 1800 as the market portfolio. It contains 600 firms from Europe, America and the Asia-Pacific region. We obtain the abnormal return as the difference of the observed return and the fitted values from (2).
In addition to the market model, other approaches to compute expected returns are employed in the literature. Section 4.2 provides additional robustness checks that consider different model specifications to compute abnormal returns.
Our empirical approach relies on multiple data sources. First, we obtain data on the [Insert Table 1 about here] Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for our final sample. Despite the discussed international concerns regarding the TCJA, the European stock market reacted positively to the final version of the bill. The mean return on December 18 th was 0.68%, and the mean abnormal return was 0.45%. The cumulative abnormal returns (gross returns) increased for the one-week window 5 and the one-month window to 0.76% (1.08%) and 2.21% (3.84%), respectively.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
The remainder of this paper attempts to determine whether firms were differently affected by the reform and whether prices reacted according to our hypotheses derived above.
To this end, we perform regressions based on two main models. We obtain geographical segment data from the Thomson Reuters Eikon database to determine whether a firm is active in the United States. Unfortunately, the reporting of segment data is not completely coherent among companies. Companies report on the country level, the continental level or other regional constructs. 6 This constitutes a challenge if we want to identify the proportion of revenues generated in the United States. For instance, if a company reports revenues in North America, we do not observe which revenue amount is generated in the United States. Therefore, we consider a dummy variable rather than relying on the exact revenue value. The dummy is set to 1 if the company either reports to have revenues in the United States or if it reports revenues in (North) America. Generally, our dummy variable indicates whether a firm is likely to operate in the United States. As shown in Table 2 , 55% of the firms in our sample are likely to be active in the United States. The model used to test Hypothesis 1 is given by (3).
(3)
is the (cumulative) abnormal return of firm i at time t, US Activity is the dummy variable that indicates the firms that generate revenues in the United States and X is a vector of control variables and country fixed effects. We include country fixed effects because the event may have a different impact on firms from different countries. For instance, Cunha and Kern (2018) have shown that stock markets react differently to U.S. events depending on their countries' j corresponds to the two-digit NACE industries. 9 We compute the competition ratio for the 63 different industries in our sample. As part of our robustness checks in Section 4.2, we also consider an alternative competition ratio based on revenues. Please note that US Comp EU is based on European industries. Accordingly, it can only approximate the competitive situation of the European market. However, the European market is highly important for most European firms. 10 As shown in Table 2 , the average firm in our sample operates in an industry with an approximate share of 5.6 % U.S. competitors. We use the following model to test Hypothesis 2:
is the competition ratio j that corresponds to the NACE classification of firm i, and all other notations from (3) carry over. With respect to Hypothesis 1, we still expect that 1 > 0. If European firms lose because of tougher competition from U.S. firms following the TCJA, we expect this effect to be particular pronounced for the firms that already face relatively high competition from U.S. firms. Therefore, we expect that 2 < 0.
8 For some NACE codes, Eurostat provides only country-level information on the number of employees for some European countries. In these cases, we construct the competition ratio by using the available data on the number of employees. We use the most recent data from 2015. If the data is only available in a previous year, we use the most recent available data. 9 Compustat does only provide data on NAICS codes, but not on NACE codes. Therefore, we rely on correspondence tables obtained from Eurostat to merge the competition ratio to the firms in our sample. 10 In 2017 EU-firms exported 3,347 € billion to other EU-countries compared to 1,879 € billion to the rest of the world (https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statisticsexplained/index.php?title=International_trade_in_goods). Figure 2 shows that lower competition ratios are associated with higher cumulative abnormal returns. Figure 2 suggests that these findings are highly persistent. The discussed differences remain approximately constant throughout the month after the event. This indicates that the findings in Figure 1 are not likely to be driven by a short-term market overreaction to our event.
Explorative Analysis
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 4 Empirical results
U.S. activity and competition
Our main specification relies on a dummy variable approach to measure whether European firms exhibited different stock market returns depending on their U.S. activity. Table   3 shows the results of an OLS regression of (3) for different event windows from one day to one month after the event.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
The variable of interest is US Activity. The coefficient is positive and statistically highly significant throughout all event windows. The effect is also meaningful in terms of size. The mean abnormal return on the day immediately after the event was 0.45%. Table 3 implies that being a firm that is active in the United States resulted in a 0.33 percentage-point higher abnormal return. Consistent with the average abnormal returns shown in Table 2 , the coefficient becomes larger as the event window gets longer and reaches up to 0.9 after one month (specification 10).
Turning to the control variables, Market Capitalization appears to be the most important factor that affects stock market returns after the event. Profitability and Growth are either insignificant or show varying signs for different event windows. Market Capitalization predominantly has a significant positive sign.
Accordingly, these results clearly suggest that investors reacted according to Hypothesis 1. The European firms that generate revenues in the United States had higher returns after the final content of the TCJA was published. Furthermore, our result does not appear to be driven by short-term market overreactions, as the positive abnormal returns are persistent for even longer event windows.
The second channel through which firms could be affected by the TCJA is competition.
Therefore, we also examine whether firms that operate in markets with strong competition from U.S. firms lost after the event. Table 4 presents the respective results. The coefficient of US Activity remains positive and highly significant similar to Table 3 . The magnitude of the coefficient is also similar. Moreover, the control variables behave comparably to the previous specification.
More important, we find supporting evidence for Hypothesis 2. The sign of the US Comp EU coefficient is negative throughout the specifications. Please note that our U.S. competition measure is based on the two-digit NACE codes and thus varies only among the corresponding industry classifications. Therefore, we report our main results both with and without industry fixed effects. For consistency, we rely on the first digit of the NACE code to form our industry fixed effects.
Firms had smaller returns if they operate in an industry for which U.S. competitors play an important role. The effect is insignificant immediately after the event, whereas the effect is significant at the 5% level for the two-day window and at the 1% level after three days. The coefficient is also meaningful in size. Consider, for instance, the coefficient of specification 6.
If we use the sample mean of the competition ratio of 0.056, the estimate suggests a decrease in the return of approximately -0.38 (= -6.789* 0.056) percentage points due to competition from U.S. firms.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
There are different explanations regarding why the effect is not statistically significant immediately after the event. One reason might be that it took investors longer to realize the competition situation of firms. While it is easy to understand whether a firm is active in the United States or not, it is more difficult to analyze the complex competition situation of a firm and how this situation has changed after the TCJA. However, the lack of statistical significance on the first day may also be due to the measurement error in our industry-based competition variable. Furthermore, markets could already anticipate that some tax reform was going to pass.
The House and the Senate versions both aimed to improve the competitiveness of U.S. firms.
Therefore, we could expect that some of the information regarding competition was already priced prior to the event. 11
Robustness checks
Our results suggest that European stock prices were indeed affected by the TCJA. This section contains various robustness checks of our results. In the following, we focus on the specification with industry fixed effects. However, the untabulated results without industry fixed effects show qualitatively similar results.
Computation of the normal return
Our main specification relies on abnormal returns calculated by a market model with the STOXX Global 1800 as the market portfolio. Table 5 shows the results regarding our main findings for different ways to compute the normal returns.
[Insert Table 5 Table 5 shows that our main results remain largely the same in terms of size and significance if we change the market portfolio to the STOXX 1800 ex Europe.
Another common approach to determine normal returns is the three-factor model proposed by Fama and French (1993) . This model also controls for the market return, similar to the market model in our main specification. However, two additional factors are included in the estimation equation that measure the performance of small companies relative to large companies and companies with a high book to market ratio relative to a low book to market ratio. We obtain data on the factors from Ken French's website. The factor values are obtained based on the stocks traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ. Thus, our factor data are computed based on the U.S. market. Accordingly, in our model, this approach eliminates the specific movement in returns that can be explained by movements in the market return and the size and value factors in the United States. By using this approach, we attempt to control for the usual co-movement of European stocks with the U.S. market. 12 Our findings remain unchanged in this specification. This result shows that the reaction of European stocks was not driven only by their usual co-movements with the factors of the U.S. market.
A third approach to compute normal returns is provided by the market adjusted return calculation. This very simple approach subtracts the market return from the observed gross return. It can be interpreted as a special case of the market model discussed in Section 3 setting = 0, = 1. Panel C shows that our results are robust if we adjust our returns to the market.
Lastly, Panel D shows the results if we use unadjusted gross returns and thus do not control for market movements at all. Once again, our main results are unaffected. Overall, Table   5 shows that following the event, the negative relation of U.S. competition and the positive 12 effect of generating revenue in the United States both appear to be highly robust with respect to the calculation of normal returns.
Alternative competition ratio
In our main specification, we proxy U.S. competition by using the fraction of U.S.controlled employees in a given European industry obtained from Eurostat. Eurostat also provides data on the revenues of U.S.-controlled companies by industry. One could argue that revenue is a better approximation for the market share. Since data availability in Eurostat is better for the number of employees, we rely on this measure for our main analysis. However, as reported in Table 6 , our main results carry over if we compute the competition ratio based on revenue. We find significant negative effects for the event windows of two or three days and one month.
Furthermore, if both ratios are suitable to proxy for the market share of U.S. firms, the measured effect size should be similar. The mean of the revenue-based competition ratio in our sample is 9.3%. If we once again focus on the three-day window (specification 3), we obtain a mean effect of competition equal to -0.31 (= -3.346 * 0.093) percentage points. Summarizing, Table 6 shows that our results are robust whether we base our competition ratio on revenue or the number of employees.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
Outlier treatment
We truncated the gross returns at the 1% level in our main analysis to limit the influence TCJA. Therefore, extreme returns are most likely driven by other firm-specific announcements unrelated to the TCJA.
In additional analyses, we also consider the returns that were not transformed at all or winsorized. Table 7 shows the results for the non-transformed returns (Panel A) and winsorized returns (Panel B). Our results remain qualitatively unchanged. For both anels, firms with U.S.
revenue had significantly higher (cumulative) abnormal returns throughout the event windows
of one day to one month. The US Comp EU coefficient shows a predominantly negative sign.
The effect is significant for the three-day window and for the one-week window in both panels.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
Alternative measures of size
Different measures can be found in the literature to approximate the size of a firm.
Among the most frequently used are total assets, total sales and market capitalization. We follow Wagner et al. (2018a) and choose the logarithm of market capitalization throughout our main analysis. However, Dang et al. (2018) have shown that many of the results in empirical corporate finance are sensitive to the choice of the size measure. To ensure that our results are not driven by our choice of market capitalization as the size proxy, levels. For the two-day window, the effect is only borderline significant in Panel A. The effect is similar in size and still highly significant for the three-day window and borderline significant for the one-week window in both panels. Therefore, although there is a slight variation in the significance levels consistent with Dang et al. (2018) , our results appear to be robust for different firm size measures.
Cross-correlation and event induced volatility
We consider the market reaction of all firms in our sample on the same date. Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) have shown that cross-correlation may result in an over-rejection of the null hypothesis of zero cumulative abnormal returns in cases of event-day clustering. To ensure that our results are not driven by this, we consider the modified Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen statistic proposed by Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) which adjusts for event induced volatility as well as cross-correlation. 13 Since we can only use the Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) method to test whether returns are non-zero we need to split our sample to gain further insights regarding our explanatory variables. Therefore, to verify that our findings regarding US Activity and US comp EU are robust after adjusting for cross-correlation, we first need to split our sample accordingly and afterwards test whether CAR's are different from zero in the corresponding subsamples.
[Insert Table 9 about here] Overall, Table 9 shows that the results regarding our hypothesis remain significant after controlling for cross-correlation and event induced volatility.
Additional dates of the legislative process
As discussed before, the House and the Senate passed different versions of the TCJA before our main event. It is natural to examine whether the European stock market had already reacted to the events associated with these earlier versions.
We follow Wagner et al. (2018b) and examine the potential effects on November 2 nd (introduction of the House bill), November 16 th (passing of the House bill) and December 2 nd (passing of the Senate bill). Once again, we need to consider time zone differences. The House bill was introduced around noon (ET) on November 2 nd . The European stock market was about to close around this time. In addition, some information regarding the House bill was previously available. Therefore, we cannot identify the exact relevant date and conduct our empirical analysis on both possible event dates of November 2 nd and November 3 rd . The passing of the House bill occurred on the afternoon of November 16 th . By then, the European stock market had already closed. We examine the potential reaction on November 17 th . The Senate passed the bill on Saturday, December 2 nd ; we therefore focus on the returns of the next Monday, December 4 th , for this event.
[Insert Table 10 about here] Table 10 presents the results. We find no significant effect of the US Activity after any of these events. As discussed earlier, until December 15 th , it was unclear how international firms outside the United States would be affected by the TCJA because of important differences between the House and the Senate versions. However, we find some differential positive effect of the overall return after the Senate version passed. Those European firms that are active in the United States had a mean abnormal return of 0.34%, while the mean abnormal return for other firms was 0.21%. However, as shown in Table 10 , this difference is insignificant if we consider the control variables.
The US Comp EU coefficient is negative and significant following the passing of the Senate version. Both versions were expected to improve the international competitiveness of U.S. firms. On this day, after both chambers passed their version of the TCJA, it became more likely that the reform was going to be implemented soon. Thus, the negative coefficient of US Comp EU on December 4 th is not surprising. Analogously, we find a borderline significant effect of US Comp EU after the introduction of the House version, once again suggesting that both versions were expected to improve the competitiveness of U.S. firms.
Conclusion
The TCJA was the largest U.S. tax reform in the last thirty years. Previous research has shown that tax reforms impact national stock markets, but we focus on cross-border effects. To this end, we analyze the reaction of European stocks after the final content of the TCJA was revealed and it became clear that the reform was going to pass. We present strong evidence that the stock market expected European firms to be affected. Firms with revenues in the United States exhibited significant positive abnormal returns. Furthermore, we construct a competition ratio that measures the market share of U.S. firms in different European industries. Markets may expect European firms to face tougher competition from their U.S. peers following the TCJA. Correspondingly, we show that firms that operate in industries where competition from Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3342182 U.S. firms is fierce exhibit significant lower returns following the event. This suggests that investors believe that the TCJA improved the international competitiveness of U.S. firms.
Changes in national tax codes have so far mainly be analyzed with respect to their domestic effects. We show that national tax code changes may have a significant impact on foreign firms. Our results suggest not only a direct effect on foreign multinational firms, subject to taxes in the respective country, but also an indirect effect through competition. While our study examines the short-term reaction to the TCJA, we look forward to future research regarding the long-term effects of the TCJA on foreign firms. Table 1 summarizes the sample selection. Starting with 9,036 firms available in Compustat, we reach our final sample of 1,718 firms with the data for all our explanatory variables. However, not all of these firms have return data for every examined event window in our regressions and some data points are eliminated through truncation. Please refer to the number of observations reported in the regression tables as the respective final sample sizes. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the returns and control variables for different event windows. All values are in percent except for market capitalization, which is measured in Million €, the Beta coefficient and the US Activity variable. 
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